№ 3, 2017
A.Gilev, A.Semenov and I.Shevtsova analyze correlation between professional career of local authorities and electoral results of the “party of power”, appealing to the explanatory power of a “political machine” concept and relying on the database that includes biographies of municipal heads in three Russian regions. The study shows that heads of local governments, who previously held positions of a deputy mayor, heads of departments or other high posts in local administration, secure better electoral results for the “party of power’ than those with business or legislative backgrounds. Skills of managing local “political machines” are formed within the executive branch, and the “machines” themselves are quite stable. Thus, mobilization of such “machines” does not require either long training or extraordinary abilities from new leaders.
№ 4, 2014
The article investigates an institution of succession and analyzes factors that contribute to the electoral success of political leaders' successors on the material of the countries in the South, Southeast and East Asia. Based on the analysis of 25 cases of succession in the history of India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, the author concludes that the circumstances most favorable for the elites' coalition in power (closedness of the regime, dependent successor, resources’ availability) appear to be less favorable for the success of succession. Having pointed out a sort of “sinking effect” (leaders that assume power from authoritarian and resource-rich rulers are more likely to lose their electoral advantage), A.Gilev at the same time emphasizes that such effect can be mitigated by the use of majoritarian electoral formula: the higher the proportion of deputies elected by the majority rule, the easier it is for the ruling group to maintain its advantage when transferring power to a successor.
Main Page ~ Authors ~ Gilev Alexei