№ 3, 2017
A.Kynev analyzes the results of Duma elections in 1993—2016 to show that the Russian model of mandates’ distribution within party lists leads to a significant distortion of regional representation in favor of the regions with the least competitive elections. Such model also stipulates the replacement of party competition with competition between regions and transforms elections into the battle of administrative resources, which encourages local governments to engage in election fraud. This results in even lower level of party competition as well as diminishes parties’ influence in general. According to Kynev, only radical reform of electoral model can fix the status quo. Electoral system should guarantee that territories obtain an adequate representation in parliament in proportion to the number of voters in these territories.
№ 2, 2015
On the basis of the analysis of a wide range of research questions related to the internal structure of the Russian parties and their electoral activity, A.Kynev comes to the conclusion that, of the accepted in modern democracies mechanisms aimed at the development of inner-party democracy, Russia, in fact, makes use only of a variation in primaries. According to his conclusion, the country finds itself in a paradoxical situation: parties formally exist, but even in case of successful elections, under the conditions of the complete domination of the executive branch their impact on the decision-making process is extremely weak. This also results in the initial inability of parties to fulfill their pre-election programs, voters’ frustration with all parties, and little interest in the inner life of parties from both ordinary citizens and elites. In general, by their internal structure Russian parties resemble other Russian political institutions that are characterized by exaggerated authority of the executive bodies and weakness of control mechanisms as such.
Main Page ~ Authors ~ Kynev Alexander