№ 2, 2011
The article analyzes paradoxes of regulation system that emerge at the juncture of bureaucratic structures. E.Paneyakh shows by the example of the Russian criminal procedure that once regulation density passes a certain threshold coordinating properties of institutions that regulate relations inside departments are at odds with their transaction properties. The more influence department rules exert over the system of an agent’s incentives (limiting the scope of his/her opportunities), the more transaction problems between agents from different departments functioning within the distinct institutional context they create. This problem results in the emergence of informal institutions that reconcile interests of these agents, while the density of interdepartmental regulations leads to the fact that the object of their activity becomes the most easily accessible source of resources that are necessary to satisfy sides.
№ 2, 2007
The author of the article makes an attempt to interpret the process that is called law enforcement using as an example relations between tax inspectors and businessmen in post-soviet Russia. The empiric base of the study was the series of autobiographic interviews with businessmen from Saint-Petersburg, Moscow, Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, and Leningrad region. E.Paneyakh analyzes the institutional consequences of the inconsistency, variability and inapplicability of Russian laws. She shows what Russian officials really control and how this control is carried out under the situation when it is not possible to get the full law enforcement. The author reviews the informal rules that regulate relationships between businessmen and officials and the pressure techniques used by the officials from control bodies to force counteragents to the fulfillment of informal conventions. E.Paneyach concludes that existing informal practices of dealing with the formal law has already been institutionalized and this makes them independent on the quality of formal laws.
Main Page ~ Authors ~ Paneyakh Ella