№ 3, 2020
The liberal theory of justice proposed by John Rawls was almost immediately criticized by communitarians. One of its main directions was Rawls's idea of the priority of law over the good. This article is intended to show that this idea was misunderstood by communitarians, who saw it as an attempt to put law above morality and similar forms of social relations. In solving this problem, N. Shaveko focuses on two objections that are usually raised against this Idea: 1) it breaks the bonds of solidarity; 2) it leaves no room for the demands of local morality. His analysis clearly demonstrates that the concept of Rawls, as well as the liberal project as a Whole, does not belittle the importance of moral ideals and duties of solidarity, but, on the contrary, creates conditions for their implementation. The need to take into account moral views that vary depending on society does not yet indicate that some basic values should not be prioritized over them. Attempts by communitarians, who in fact themselves adhere to certain fundamental values, putting them above any concept of the good, to justify the supremacy of ideas about a good life are not convincing. According to the author, communitarian criticism does not undermine the foundations of Rawls ' theory of justice, but, on the contrary, enriches it. The differences between communitarians and liberals are partly due to the incorrect use of the concepts of "the concept of good" and "moral merit", partly to the untenable thesis that moral obligations can arise solely through membership in a particular community, and partly to groundless attempts to give normative significance to the trivial fact of the interdependence of man and society and to prove the imaginary impossibility of making judgments about justice without defining the goals of certain social institutions.
Shaveko N. A.
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