Starodubtsev Andrei

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  • № 4, 2018

    • Conditions for Successful Governance in Modern Russia (Subnational Level)

      The article is devoted to the discussion of the hypothetical conditions of the successful activity of the regional governments in the contemporary Russia. Based on the literature analyzing the features of governance under domination of practices of bad governance, as well as considering circumstances and factors of governance at the subnational level, A.Starodubtsev describes the challenges that the regional governments face during the execution of their direct responsibilities. Analyzing the institutional, structural and personal factors that are able to affect the process and results of regional public administration, he studies the possible outcomes of their various combinations. The key thesis of the article is the idea that the combination of a governor’s intention upon creating favorable conditions for the development of the regional economy, on the one hand, and ensuring political control over the region, on the other, established positive outcome for long-term socio-economic development. All other combinations of factors are assessed as less favorable. At the same time, in accordance with the basic assumptions of the model proposed by the author intra-elite conflicts create the greatest difficulties for development. Under the Russian political circumstances, intra-elite conflicts are fundamentally non-institutionalized. As a result, political actors do not have well-established channels of interest representation as well as a long-term planning horizon, accountability to voters and other mechanisms, which usually mitigate the consequences of such conflicts. However, the reasons for the lack of stable development in regions with intra-elite conflicts require further analysis. Researchers have yet to learn what exactly impedes economic growth in polycentric systems at the subnational level and how political conflict between different segments of the elite affects the selection of those who govern the respective regions.

      DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2018-91-4-70-89

      Pages: 70-89

  • № 4, 2014

    • POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN MODERNIZATION: RUSSIAN REFORMS OF THE 2000s

      In order to answer the question of whether key socio-economic changes can be implemented successfully under the conditions of electoral authoritarianism, V.Gel’man and A.Starodubtsev turn to the analysis of the Russian experience of the 2000s. The study conducted by the authors shows that, despite the existence of opportunities for authoritarian modernization, its implementation encounters a number of political and institutional constraints, including the poor quality of the state apparatus and inefficiency of institutional design. The authors conclude that under the regimes of electoral authoritarianism the success of an innovative policy is determined by three interrelated factors: (1) strategic priority of reforms in the eyes of a country’s president; (2) focused implementation of these reforms by their proponents within certain ministerial jurisdictions; (3) one-step nature of the reforms and their implementation within a limited time.

      DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2014-75-4-6-30

  • № 2, 2009

    • REGIONAL INTERESTS IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT: SINGLE-MANDATE DEPUTIES AS BUDGET LOBBYISTS

      The article explores the role of single-mandate deputies in lobbying regional interests. Having analyzed the influence of deputies elected through the majority system in single-member constituencies on decision-making in the budget sphere, A.Starodubtsev comes to a conclusion that the corresponding part of the deputy corps has indeed been fulfilling the functions of regional lobbyists, and the loss of this representation channel by subjects of the RF will inevitably affect the whole system of their relations with the federal center. According to the author’s assessment, one of the consequences of this will very probably be that an open and observable procedure of regional lobbying within Duma committees will be replaced by an unofficial “haggle” between representatives of federal and regional elites.

      DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2009-53-2-90-101