Timmermann Heinz

The future of European-Russian relations

The author thinks that the first years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union relations between European Union and Russia developed under the sign of mutual great expectations. They did not always come true, which eventually lead to disappointment and the clash of interests including those related to the quick geopolitical transformation of Europe.

H. Timmerman analyzes the development of relationships between Russia and EU in different areas offering his recommendations in each of them. In his opinion pragmatism and new realism should become the basis of EU-Russian relationships. Such approach will help avoiding exaggerated requirements and fill the gap between the rhetoric and the reality.

DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2004-34-3-109-129

Pages: 109-129

Strategic partnership. What the European Union is to do in order to establish more tight links with Russia?

According to the author, widening of the partnership between the European Union and Russia must be based on pragmatic ways. In this respect, one should not indulge into illusions about too speedy integration, on the one hand, and to be ready to inevitable recoils, on the other hand. The author reviews the mutual interest of Russia and the EU in the cooperation. He thinks that the EU policy towards Russia is multidimensional, which is sufficiently different from the U.S. approach.

The author sees the pledge of the acceleration of the rapprochement between the EU and Russia in their common understanding of the basic values and principles of democracy, the compatibility of economic systems and foreign policy reference points. In this context the problems of Kaliningrad region and the problems of Belorussia related to Russia by union relations are touched upon.

DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2002-25-2-84-96

Pages: 84-96

Europe – Germany – Russia

The article formulates a principally serious question: what should be the position of the West European Union towards Russia in the situation of a financial crisis that burst out there in August, 1998. Both extremes, namely, following the former line or adopting a strategy, in accordance with which Russia should be left alone, do not seem to have much of a prospective. Renouncing to co-operate with Russia, the West would have shown that it has lost hope to develop there modern and ever more European state institutes. This would have meant giving a hand to the imperial forces in Russia, that preach the national political, economic and cultural peculiarity and thus oppose the West. At the same time the economic and political crises outlaw the former policy. In the new conditions, proceeding from their deep understanding of the amendments in the strategic line of Russian development, the Europeans might modify their support to Russia (provide «intellectual support», work more actively in the regions, etc.).

DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-1998-8-2-147-158

Pages: 147-158